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REVISIONS TO THE MEXICO-UNITED STATES
AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT, 1965-1970
By H. MAX HEALEYt
We discussed our bilateral air transport agreements or arrangements with 12 countries,
with the objective of promoting tourism and business and cultural travel.1
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States
I. INTRODUCTION
B Y THE EXCHANGE of diplomatic notes and a number of ancillary
documents at Mexico City on 4 August 1965, delegations of Mexico
and the United States concluded two months of intensive negotiation re-
sulting in far-reaching changes in the pattern of air transport services
between the two countries. The amendments agreed upon in the 1965
negotiations constitute revisions to the original definitive Air Transport
Agreement of 15 August 1960.
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REVISIONS
The changes agreed upon are significant for a number of reasons. As
far as Mexico is concerned, they signal a departure from that country's
historical posture regarding protection of national carriers vis- -vis foreign
competition. In the case of the United States, the Agreement constitutes
an exception, however temporary, to the Government's enunciated policy
on limitation of frequency or capacity in scheduled international air car-
rier operations. Other distinctive features of the revised Agreement are:
(1) the five-year period of the extension to 30 June 1970; (2) provision
for four of the five designated United States carriers2 and a second Mexican
carrier' to serve Acapulco internationally with through service; (3) in-
clusion in the Route Schedule of so-called "border services" to be per-
formed by a United States carrier," and; (4) the addition of four more
cities in the United States' to be served by Mexican carriers. Assuming
implementation of the "border services" by another airline in addition to
t A.B., Hanover College; M.A., Indiana. Director General of Cia. Mexicana de Aviacion. Member
of the Colombian Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference at The Hague on Revisions to the War-
saw Convention, 1955.
1 Annual State of the Nation Speech (Informe Anual del Presidente), Excelsior, Mexico City,
2 Sept. 1965, p. 21.
2 American Airlines, Braniff, Eastern Air Lines, and Western Air Lines. Of the five designated
United States carriers, only Pan American did not gain authority to extend its operations into
Acapulco.
' Cia. Mexicana de Aviaci6n.
4 Diplomatic Note No. 213, 4 Aug. 1965, from the United States Ambassador to the Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Relations. See Appendix III, para. 1, Routes K and L, infra.
' Corpus Christi, Houston, Laredo, and Phoenix.
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those already designated under the Agreement, there will be a total of
eight air carriers (six United States and two Mexican) with operating
authority to serve as many as thirty-two cities' in the United States and
Mexico-more than in the case of any other country with which Washing-
ton has reached formal agreement on air transport services.
III. EARLIER AGREEMENTS
A. The 1957 Memorandum Of Understanding
On 7 March 1957, Mexico signed the original "Memorandum of Under-
standing" constituting the "provIsional arrangement" concerning scheduled
commercial air services between the two countries. This ended years of
resistance to repeated overtures by the United States Government to effect
such an agreement. From the formal title given the document it might
be adduced that little more than a modus operandi was involved. However,
this was far from the case because the terms of this Memorandum of
Understanding are essentially the same as those of the definitive agreement
which succeeded it in 1960, and which, with the 1965 revisions, is still
in effect. The two agreements contain the same number of articles7 and
follow the same order as to content, with only minor alterations to the
text. Though not fully recognized by the Mexican government, the 1957
Memorandum of Understanding; was, for all practical purposes, a "Ber-
muda-type" agreement with conventional language on such important
aspects as ownership and control, 8 recognition of licenses,' user charges
and customs exemption on consumable supplies," origin and destination of
traffic," rates," and other subjects. Only the form of the Agreement was
unconventional. The route schedule appeared at the very beginning of
the document below the title "Memorandum of Understanding" and was
followed by an "Annex" containing the eighteen sections or articles
which constitute the "provisional arrangement" in full. The Memorandum
provided for parity of routes, with each country entitled to seven routes."
Service to a total of thirteen cities" was involved, nine in the United States
and four in Mexico. With the implementation of the Memorandum of
' Chicago, Corpus Christi, Dallas, Detroit, Fort Worth, Harlingen/San Benito, Houston, Laredo,
Los Angeles, Miami, Mission/McAllen/Edinburg, New Orleans, New York, Phoenix, San Antonio,
San Diego,* Tampa/St. Petersburg, Tucson,* and Washington in the United States; Acapulco,
Cozumel Islands, Guadalajara, Hermosillo, La Paz, Mazatlin,* Merida,* Mexico City, Monterrey,
Puerto Vallarta,* Tampico,* Tijuana,* and Veracruz in Mexico.
* Cities so indicated may be served only as an intermediate point. The remainder may be served
as either terminal or co-terminal.
7Referred to as sections in the 1957 Memorandum. Provisional Arrangement with Mexico,
7 Mar. 1957, 1-18, [1957] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 306, T.I.A.S. No. 3776; Agreement, with Schedule,
with Mexico, 15 Aug. 1960, [1961] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 60, T.I.A.S. No. 4675.
'Provisional Arrangement with Mexico, 7 Mar. 1957, § IV, [1957] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 306,
T.I.A.S. No. 3776.
9 Id. § VI.
"o Id. § VII.
" Id. § X.
12 Id. § XI.
"aProvisional Agreement with Mexico, 7 Mar. 1957, [1957] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 306, T.I.A.S.
No. 3776. See Appendix I, infra.
i4 Of the original thirteen cities, three have been deleted in subsequent revisions to the pact.
These deletions were Brownsville, Texas, and Tampico and Tapachula in Mexico.
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Understanding, a major expansion of scheduled air services between the
two countries was underway. The effect of this original agreement was to
exist until 30 June 1959, indicating some of the concern felt by the
Mexican government with respect to possible effect on its own carriers.
The operations of the American carriers to Mexico expanded much more
rapidly than those of the Mexican airlines which, nonetheless, were obliged
to take on heavy commitments for new equipment in order to compete
in the expanded international services. The result was to bring about
important and lasting changes in the structure of Mexico's airline industry.
Aeronaves de Mexico, formerly a privately owned carrier, was taken over
by the Mexican government in June 1959 when it was unable to meet
financial obligations arising from the acquisition of new equipment for
its Mexico City-New York service. Two years later, Guest Aerovias Mexico
likewise succumbed and was absorbed by Aeronaves, which continues to
be wholly owned by the Mexican government through its central credit
institution, Nacional Financiera. Only Mexicana de Aviaci6n (CMA),
affiliated with Pan American World Airways but primarily Mexican-
owned and controlled, succeeded in remaining essentially a private carrier."
However, in so doing, it accumulated losses between 1957 and 1963 equiva-
lent to more than seventy-five percent of its total capital."
B. The Definitive Agreement Of 1960
The provisional arrangement established under the terms of the Memo-
randum of Understanding was to terminate on 30 June 1959. The arrange-
ment also provided that at the request of either government prior to 30
May 1959, talks might be initiated to discuss the regulation of air services
between the two countries after this initial period. At the time the talks
took place in Mexico City, the new political administration of Mexico,
under President Adolfo L6pez Mateos, was only six months old. The
Mexican airlines had by this time felt the full impact of the intensive com-
petition from United States carriers and were in serious financial difficul-
ties. A nation-wide pilots' strike at the beginning of the year on the issue
of union recognition culminated in direct governmental intervention'
of the airlines. At the time of the negotiations on extension or renewal
of the air agreement, the Mexican carriers involved were legally under the
authority and control of government-appointed administrators. With this
background, and following desultory and inconclusive negotiations, the
parties decided just prior to the expiration of the original agreement to
" Nacional Financiera also owns 9% of the stock of Mexicana de Aviaci6n; the balance is in
the hands of private investors.
10 It would be unfair to attribute all of the carriers' woes to the bilateral air arrangements. Dur-
ing this same period, the Mexican airlines were plagued by a series of labor disputes, including
strikes and work stoppages, with adverse economic effects. As a result, several other Mexican airlines
engaged exclusively in domestic service also went out of existence: Aerolineas Mexicanas, Aero-
transportes, Transportes Aereos Mexicanos, Tigres Voladores, Trans Mar de Cortis, and Lineas
Aereas Unidas Mexicanas.
"7 Spanish requisa, applied in this instance under MEx. CONsT., art. 89, pt. I, and of the Law of
General Means of Communications, art. 112. Juridically the procedure is roughly equivalent to
action taken from time to time in the United States under presidential emergency powers.
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extend the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding for an additional
year.
By 1960, the plight of the Mexican carriers had worsened. The jet age
had arrived, and the American carriers were pressing hard for an agree-
ment which would assure them the right to use their new aircraft with
greatly increased capacity in service to Mexico City. The Mexican carriers,
on the other hand, wanted some kind of reasonable limitation on fre-
quencies and capacities to warrant the new and enlarged financial under-
takings for their own jet equipment. A number of proposals intended to
achieve this end were advanced in the course of negotiations in both Wash-
ington and Mexico City starting in June 1960. The Mexican proposals,
following recommendations contained in a three-carrier memorandum
submitted at the invitation of the government, embraced such ideas as a
revision to the "exclusive track" system whereby a single carrier of one
or the other country would operate without competition over the routes
involved, pre-determination of frequency and capacity offerings by re-
lating them to load factors, and absolute parity of carriers capacity in
parallel competition on a quid pro quo basis."8 All such proposals were
more or less categorically rejected by the United States negotiators as
contrary to public policy or even beyond their authority due to statutory
limitations. Negotiations were nonetheless protracted, and it became neces-
sary to effect a forty-five-day extension of the original agreement. The
first definitive Air Transport Agreement between Mexico and the United
States was signed at Mexico City on 15 August 1960.'9 Duration of this
Agreement was to be three years from date of signature.
As noted above, the basic terms of the new Agreement did not vary in
any substantial way from those of the original Memorandum of Under-
standing. The Route Schedule did undergo considerable alteration through
deletion of certain services and the addition of others. In addition, the
conventional form was followed in the 1960 Agreement with the Route
Schedule annexed to the eighteen articles of the basic accord. The principal
changes occurring to routes reserved to designated United States carriers
were: (1) Brownsville, Tampico, and Tapachula were all dropped as inter-
mediate points served optionally on Route "G," Houston-Mexico City and
beyond; (2) the new Route "H," San Antonio-Mexico City, was added
and the former city ceased to be a co-terminal with Dallas and Chicago;
(3) the restricted cargo and mail-only route, Miami, Tampa/St. Peters-
burg-Merida, Cozumel and beyond, was added as Route "I," and (4)
Route "J," Miami, Tampa-Merida, Mexico City, was added with the proviso
that the intermediate stop in Merida would be obligatory in this case, an
exception to the general practice making intermediate points optional.
1" Recomendaciones al Gobierno Mexicano para las pidlicas con el Gobierno Norleamericano sobre
un Convenio Bilateral Aereo (Recommendations to the Mexican Government in connection with
talks with the United States Government regarding a Bilateral Air Treaty); Memorandum of
Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., Compafiia Mexicana de Aviaci6n, S. A., Guest Aerovias Mexico, S. A.
de C. V., March 1960.
"Agreement, with Schedule, with Mexico, 15 Aug. 1960, arts. 1-18, [1961] 1 U.S.T. &
O.I.A. 60, T.I.A.S. No. 4675.
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This condition continues to be an issue in discussions concerning the
Agreement.
In the case of Mexican carriers, Route "B," Mexico City-Chicago, was
expanded to include Dallas and Ft. Worth as co-terminals; former Route
"D" from Mexico City to New Orleans was substituted by a new route
Mazatlin, Torreon, Monterrey-San Antonio, via intermediate points in
Mexico; Monterrey was added as a co-terminal with Mexico City on
Route "G" to San Antonio; and a new Route "H," Hermosillo-Tucson,
was added. Finally, as in the Memorandum of Understanding, a ninth
route, designated "I," was left pending, more or less with the idea of
achieving route parity. However, as will be shown later on, this also be-
came a source of difficulty in subsequent negotiations.
Most of the new services provided under the definitive Agreement were
implemented within the ensuing twelve months. Braniff became the fifth
United States carrier to serve Mexico as a result of the bilateral. Mexicana
de Aviacion was required to surrender its Monterrey-San Antonio service
in favor of the government-owned Aeronaves ° but acquired the right to
serve Dallas as a result of this city's being co-terminalled with Chicago.
Again, a marked expansion occurred in the air services operating between
the two countries, with Mexican carriers feeling the impact of the compe-
tition of the United States airlines which, at all stages of the Agreement,
have provided about fifty per cent greater capacity. As a result, Mexico
resisted United States efforts to effect still further capacity increases,
through additional frequencies, as traffic rose steadily. Such resistance was
especially evident in the case of the New York-Mexico City and Miami-
Mexico City sectors and caused United States carriers to make repeated
pleas in Washington for some kind of remedy.
Again, as in 1959, a more or less perfunctory one-year extension of the
definitive Pact to 30 June 1964 was agreed to shortly before expiration of
the original three-year period.
C. The "Gentlemen's Agreement ''2' Of 1964
The preceding was the situation which prevailed in mid-June 1964
when, with approximately sixty days of the renewal period remaining, a
Mexican delegation composed of the Director of Civil Aeronautics, the
Deputy Director, and the Chief of the Office of International Services in
the Direccion visited Washington to discuss possible renewal. Little pub-
licity was given this visit, and the Mexican carriers, which on previous
occasions had been given an opportunity to express their views, were not
consulted. It seems quite clear that the official United States representatives
were not prepared for major negotiations with Mexico at the time, prob-
"0 This resulted from the assignment of Route "D" (Mazatlin, Torreon, Monterrey-San Antonio)
to Aeronaves. However, on the suspension of service by Aeronaves on this route in August 1963,
service was resumed by Mexicana.
" This is the term applied by officials of both the Mexican and United States governments in
referring to the general understandings reached as a result of the negotiations covered in this section.
While the text of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" has never been released, considerable information
concerning the Agreement came to light when difficulties ensued in connection with enforcement of
certain aspects of the agreement as will be seen in the course of this section.
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ably expecting another routine renewal with complete formal discussions
to be deferred for several months. Full information on this aspect of the
negotiation is not available; however, the Mexicans went prepared to dis-
cuss matters of substance and particularly the definition of Route "I,"
pending for nearly four years. The Mexican request for a Mexico City-
Detroit route with beyond rights to Canada came as a surprise to the
Americans who maintained that it had never been intended that Route
"I" should be a major trunk route of such proportions. The Americans
contended that the new service should be of a secondary nature, suggest-
ing the possibility of a trans-border service. The discussions apparently
concentrated almost entirely on the question of the additional route now
requested by Mexico. Surprisingly', however, the United States delegation
interjected the question of a possible "freeze" on capacity, frequency, and
routes during the period of any extension, with the understanding that
agreement in this respect would not apply to the new route. The aim of
the proposed "freeze" was clearly to prevent the Mexican carriers from
effecting any increases in capacity or frequency, so long as the Mexican
government continued a priori to deny requests by United States carriers
for similar increases. Such an arrangement would guarantee the preemi-
nence of the American operators by retaining their wide margin over the
capacity then offered by Mexican carriers.
Prior to the start of these negotiations, Cia. Mexicana de Aviacion had
entered a formal application with the Civil Aeronautics Board for a
foreign air carrier permit to operate from Cozumel Island to Miami.
This application was based on authorization already granted by the Mexi-
can authorities for the operation in question. Although the proceedings in
the case2 were pending at the time, there is no indication that serious
consideration was given by either party to designating Route "I" for this
proposed service, especially in view of the Mexican government's much
greater interest in obtaining Detroit. In fact, the chief of the Mexican
delegation is known to have insisted that an answer from the United States
in this regard was essential to Mexico's decision on whether to extend the
Agreement or let it expire on 15 August. This was apparently sufficient
to cause the United States to relent, and it was agreed that Route "I"
should be Mexico City-Detroit, and that such route might continue on
to a city in Canada without traffic rights between such city and Detroit.
There was also a tacit understanding that the point served in Canada on
this route would be Montreal and not Toronto, which had been strongly
opposed by the United States in defense of its own carriers. After just
four days of negotiation, memoranda were drawn up on 19 June covering
the principal points of agreement, including the "freeze" proposed by the
United States delegation. In all other respects the Agreement was to re-
main in effect for an additional period expiring 30 June 1965. As will be
seen, the "freeze" agreement was to become a major point of difference
and gave rise to many problems over the next several months.
22 Application of Cia. Mexicana de Aviacion for Foreign Air Carrier Permit, CAB Docket No.
15372 (29 June 1964).
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Information regarding the extension appeared in a number of peri-
odicals' but no official information was conveyed to the Mexican carriers.
Aeronaves de Mexico, however, did make application to the CAB for the
Mexico City-Detroit and beyond route and was issued the corresponding
foreign air carrier permit." Mexicana de Aviacion continued to await
action on its pending Cozumel-Miami application which had not been
covered by the Bilateral.
During 1964, air travel to Mexico reached unprecedented proportions
so that during seasonal peak periods the existing capacity proved inade-
quate. This was especially so with respect to those services operating from
the United States to a number of points along Mexico's Pacific coast,
especially Mazatlin, Puerto Vallarta, and Guadalajara. Municipal authori-
ties and civic organizations representing hotel operators and other tourist
interests began clamoring for more service, especially to meet the heavy
year-end demand. Mexicana de Aviaci6n, which maintained service to these
points, expressed its willingness to provide whatever additional service
might be required by demand but at the same time requested an official
clarification from the aeronautical authorities as to the possibility in this
regard in view of the recent renewal of the air Agreement.' On 3 August,
the company received an official communication"6 from the Direcci6n
General de Aeronautica Civil stating "at no point does the renewal of the
reference Treaty refer to a freezing of capacities nor much less fre-
quencies," and indicating further that the company might proceed to
establish new flights from Mexico City to Los Angeles with a stop in
Puerto Vallarta, subject only to operational requirements. Based on this
information, Mexicana immediately began planning a substantial increase
in schedules to take effect before the end of the year. In order to do so,
it was necessary for the carrier to purchase additional flight equipment as
well as to hire several new crews and to undertake an intensive pilot train-
ing program. New schedules, representing an increase of approximately
eighteen per cent in the volume of the carrier's domestic and international
operations, were filed with the Mexican authorities. These were approved
and put into effect on 15 December 1964. The major changes affecting
operations to the United States were a reversion to daily jet service to
Chicago rather than six flights weekly; substitution of Comet jet equip-
ment operating five times weekly to Dallas rather than a daily DC-6;
and, most importantly, the addition of a third daily flight to Los Angeles
via Puerto Vallarta using piston equipment because of airport restrictions.
This flight, which also served Guadalajara, operated non-stop between
Puerto Vallarta and Los Angeles four times weekly and the other three
times landed at Mazatlin as well. This was the service which proved to
'E.g., Journal of Commerce, 26 June 1964; 153 Aviation Daily 30 (7 July 1964); 153 Avia-
tion Daily 54 (10 July 1964).
"Application of Aeronaves de Mexico for Amendment of Its Foreign Air Carrier Permit, CAB
Docket No. 15482, CAB Order No. E-21577 (13 Nov. 1964) (approved by the President 10 Dec.
1964).
"Oficio of Cia. Mexicana de Aviacion, ref. PVR/3 83, 15 July 1964 (formal memoranda).
"Oficio of the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Direcci6n General de Aeronautica
Civil, Exp. 334 (08)/10-375950, 30 July 1964 (formal memoranda).
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be the major problem, since it did actually represent a substantial increase"'
in the capacity offered by the Mexican carrier along the West Coast.
However, it happened that about the same time Western Air Lines sought
and was granted approval by the Mexican government to substitute Boeing
jet equipment for the Electras used in the carrier's thrice weekly service
from Los Angeles to Mexico City via San Diego; Western also operated
eleven weekly non-stop services to Mexico City using Boeing 720s. This
substitution of equipment in the flights operating via San Diego repre-
sented an increase of approximately ninety seats weekly in each direction,
and, as a result, the total capacity offering of the two carriers was almost
identical. This fact, however, did not avoid representations from Washing-
ton regarding alleged violation of the "gentlemen's agreement."
A new political administration had taken office on 1 December 1964
under President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. A new Minister of Communications
and a new Director of Civil Aeronautics had been named, and most of
the other policy-level officials were likewise new appointees. Not having
been in the previous administration, there seems to be no question that
they were unaware of the so-called "gentlemen's agreement" and were
taken by surprise at the situation with which they were suddenly con-
fronted. The United States authorities, lacking any legal foundation for
suspending the new flights, could only rely on trying to get the Mexican
authorities to take such action, but they too were faced with a dilemma.
All of this occurred at the peak season of the year, with hotels as well
as airlines booked full. Any such suspension would certainly have met
strong protest from several sectors, including state and local government
officials. Perhaps worst of all, the politically strong and independent Na-
tional Airline Pilots' Union (ASPA) would beyond any doubt have
sought recourse through an amparo, an action somewhat similar to an
injunction, invoked as a defense against acts of governmental authority.
The officials concerned did not welcome the prospect of such developments
and handled this very delicate situation tactfully and skillfully. The
Secretary of Communications requested Mexicana to facilitate a solution
by routing all of the new flights through Mazatlin thereby giving them
the legal status of "extra sections,." since this type of operation had been
specifically exempted from the "freeze." Moreover, the Mexican govern-
ment had been liberal in granting approval for numerous extra sections
by United States carriers. While the United States carriers and certain
governmental officials were possibly not altogether satisfied with this
solution, it is clear that any other action to suspend or limit these con-
troversial flights would have proved extremely inimical to Mexico's im-
portant tourist industry.
IV. MEXICO'S "SMOKELESS INDUSTRY"
The stage was now set for full, formal negotiations in advance of the
30 June 1965 expiration date set as part of the "gentlemen's agreement"
2 Roughly 44%, from 1,204 seats to 1,736 weekly in each direction.
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the year before. Air services between Mexico and the United States had
been regulated by a formal bilateral pact or similar instrument for eight
years. No changes of substance had occurred, but routes had been added
and the total volume of scheduled operations between the two countries had
been greatly expanded. Neither party, however, was completely satisfied
with the manner in which the Agreement had been implemented. But be-
fore examining the progress and results of the 1965 negotiations, it is worth
examining the tourist industry in the context of Mexico's national econ-
omy.
Employment in the tourist industry in Mexico approaches the 300,000
mark. In 1963, foreign visitors to Mexico numbered 1,080,766'8 of whom
910,000 were United States residents; in 1964, the number of foreign
visitors reached 1,234,235" of whom 990,000 were residents of the United
States. For the period 1960-1964, dollar expenditures of United States








The significance of these figures in the total economy of Mexico can be
appreciated by the fact that income attributable to tourism represented
4.4 %i of the country's gross national product (GNP) in 1963. The foreign
exchange generated from tourism was equivalent to 12.9% of the coun-
try's total investment in capital goods the same year. Generally, tourism can
be considered to account for roughly 407%3 of the total foreign income de-
rived by Mexico. Over the past decade the income from Mexico's tourist
industry has recorded an average annual increase of 10%,' about double
the growth rate of most other major industries in the country and about
double the rate of increase in the GNP for the same period.
From the foregoing it was clear that all of the many aspects of so im-
portant an industry would have a direct bearing on any full-scale discus-
sions concerning the country's international air transport services. This
proved to be the case. That this was fully appreciated by officials of the
United States Government responsible for policy in the forthcoming
negotiations is evidenced by the circulation of a document35 entitled "Tour-
ism and the United States-Mexico Air Passenger Market" just shortly be-
fore the start of the negotiations. With authorship attributed to the CAB
"s Brochure of the Fondo Privado de fomento Turistico, A.C., (Private Fund for the Promotion
of Tourism) (1965).
" Ibid.
3o Patterson, The Big Picture 1964-65, reprinted from ASTA Travel News, March-July 1965.
a' See note 28 supra.
32 Ibid.
33 Progreso 64/65, Visi6n Press, New York, p. 95.
3 4 THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, 2 NOTICIAs EcoNOMICAS INTERAMERICANAS 19 (June 1965).
3 CAB, TOuRIsM AND THE UNITED STATES-MExiCo AIR PASSENGER MARKET (1965).
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and dated 9 April 1965, this study reached many key Mexican government
officials at the very time that they were evaluating and determining their
own policy orientation in advance of the new round of negotiations on
extension of the Pact. The study cited the usual figures on number of
foreign visitors' expenditures, " volume of United States residents' travel
to Mexico, and similar statistics. With respect to air travel, the study pur-
ports to show that between 1959 and 1963, volume had increased at a rate
of only 6 per cent per annum whereas the rate for other modes of transport
had been 10 per cent during this same period."7 It also contends that the
United States air carriers were experiencing considerably higher than aver-
age load factors in their operations to Mexico and, therefore, so long as they
continued to be subject to frequency restrictions, there was no incentive to
undertake major promotions which they were otherwise prepared to do. In
this regard, there were, in fact, concrete examples and commitments. West-
ern Air Lines which, according to the survey, had spent $600,0003' "to pro-
mote travel to Mexico" in 1964 would increase its expenditure to the
level of $750,000 to $1 million."' Without citing any specific figure, Pan
American likewise offered to increase its advertising and promotional
expenditure on behalf of Mexico by 50 per cent. ' The CAB study also
pointed out that the British West Indies, the Bahamas, Guatemala, and the
Dominican Republic had all outpaced Mexico in the growth of tourism in
recent years. To summarize the theme of this interesting and undoubtedly
effective monograph, air travel to Mexico had been deterred by artificial re-
straints which had in turn retarded the development of tourism, the bulk
of which comes from the United States and constitutes an important
"American contribution"'" to the Mexican economy. Finally, since the
Mexican carriers had improved their participation in the total market"
to the extent that they now constituted a "strong competitive force," they
should rely on promotion rather than "share."
From the course of the negotiations which followed, it will be seen
that these arguments were of great influence, and the generous offers of
the United States airlines to expand their promotional and advertising
budgets in the interests of increased travel to Mexico proved highly con-
vincing.
V. THE 1965 NEGOTIATIONS IN MEXICO CITY
Since the previous negotiations leading to the one-year extension to 30
"I Id. According to Table "A," total foreign visitor expenditures in Mexico in recent years
have been: $585 million in 1962, $656 million in 1963, and $520 million for the first nine months
of 1964.
37 Id. at 4.
as See note 35 supra at 29, table 1. This figure would seem open to some question since it would
be equivalent to more than 40% of the combined expenditures of all five United States airlines
operating to Mexico. Elsewhere, in an Appendix this is the amount referred to as budgeted for
"activities in the United States and Mexico.'
39 See note 35 supra at 17.
40 Ibid.
41 See note 35 supra at 7.
"'Id. at 26, Table "F." During the 1959-1964 period Mexican carriers' participation in the
United States-Mexico air travel market rose from 32.1% to 44.9%.
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June 1965, had taken place in Washington, it was arranged for the new
round to be initiated in Mexico City with the possibility of subsequently
transferring the site to Washington in case it became necessary to recess.
Despite some brief recess, all of the negotiations were conducted in Mexico
City and continued virtually without interruption from 25 May 1965 until
signing of the final papers on 4 August 1965.
Accordingly, in the course of the negotiations it became necessary to
arrange two interim extensions, the first of which was announced on 2
July for a period of fifteen days, or until 15 July. This indicated that the
negotiators felt that final agreement could be reached within this addi-
tional period. However, on 16 July it was announced that a further three-
week extension to 6 August had been agreed upon; according to the
official communique "substantial agreement" had been reached with only
final details to be resolved. As will be seen, most of this final period was
devoted to involved discussions of frequency in which the various carrier
representatives participated actively.
A. The Delegations
In contrast to most previous negotiations, the United States delegation
on this occasion did not include any member of the Civil Aeronautics
Board.' Chief negotiator and head of the United States delegation was
William E. Knight, Assistant Chief of the Aviation Negotiations Division
under the State Department's Bureau of Economic Affairs. Also repre-
senting the State Department was Mr. James Ferretti, formerly attached
to the Embassy of the United States in Mexico, and Mr. Joseph B. Kyle,
Transportation and Communications Officer in the Embassy. The top
Civil Aeronautics Board official on the delegation was Richard J. O'Melia,
Associate Director of the Bureau of International Affairs, assisted by Mr.
John Hoff of the Board's staff. While not a member of the delegation,
Mr. James Landry was present as an observer on behalf of the Air Trans-
port Association.
The Mexican delegation, which was much more numerous, included in
addition to officials of the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes,
officials of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, representatives of both of
the country's leading air carriers (as official members of the delegation),
a representative of the Mexican Pilots' Union, the Asociacion Sindical de
Pilotos Aviadores, ASPA, and officials representing the two governmental
agencies responsible for tourist promotion, the important Consejo Nacional
de Turismo headed by former President Miguel Aleman, and the Tourist
Department. Titular head of the delegation was Ing. Juan Manuel Ramirez
Caraza, Undersecretary of Communications in the previous administration.
Chief spokesman for the delegation, however, was Ing. Ramon Perez
Morquecho, appointed to the post of Director General of Civil Aero-
43 In the 1960 negotiations, the United States delegation was headed by CAB Chairman Alan
Boyd, now Under Secretary of Commerce and the Administration's ranking transportation official.
Member Chan Gurney took an active part in the discussions leading to the 1964 "Gentlemen's
Agreement."
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nautics by the Minister of Communications shortly after taking office the
preceding December. Aeronautical matters had traditionally been treated
as an exclusive province of the Direccion General de Aeronautica Civil
reporting directly to the Minister.
Despite such broad representation of interests, both public and private,
in the official Mexican delegation, the top policy official throughout the
negotiations was Ing. Jos6 Antonio Padilla Segura, Secretary of Communi-
cations. Where any critical decision was involved, the matter was referred
to him. Having cabinet rank, he also had access to the President. This
proved necessary on at least one occasion. It is also clear that President Diaz
Ordaz was at all times informed of the progress of the negotiations.
B. The Agreement On Frequency Escalation
Insofar as the course of actual negotiations is concerned, because of
their current nature it is impossible in most cases to document references.
The writer has had access to most of the working papers developed during
the negotiations, including the documents embodying formal proposals
exchanged between the delegations. It was also necessary on a number of
occasions, both during the negotiations and subsequently, for this writer
to consult with one or more members of either the Mexican or United
States delegations as well as with government officials of both countries,
whether or not members of the delegations.
At the very outset of the negotiations, the American delegation took a
strong stand on the matter of frequency and capacity, in effect saying
that this was the central issue to be resolved, and furthermore that it was
to be resolved in advance of any other question. Until a solution was
reached with respect to the frequency-capacity issue, the United States
delegation was not prepared to discuss any other phase of the Agreement.
Clearly, this was to be the first order of business and unless settled to
their satisfaction, it was indicated that they would return to Washington
immediately.
It was obvious that this categorical statement by the United States
delegation took the Mexicans by surprise. In fact, they had expected so
important a question to be among the last on which agreement would
be reached and had intended to proceed with discussion of an orderly
agenda, laying aside temporarily any major question which presented a
special problem or on which immediate agreement was impossible. The
whole question was whether frequency and capacity were to continue to
be determined a priori and in advance on the basis of previous experience
of the carrier or whether, in accordance with the Bermuda principles of
Article 10 of the Agreement, frequency and capacity would be subject
only to a posteriori review, with carriers having the right to determine
without restriction of any kind the volume of service to be offered. This
latter, of course, was the position advocated by the Americans.
The Mexican representatives defended themselves as well as possible in
the face of the strong position taken by the United States, but step-by-
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step had to agree to a gradual transition from the prior system to the new
unlimited situation upon which the United States Government was insist-
ing. From this point, it developed that the new Agreement would run for
a period of five years, to 30 June 1970, during which time frequencies
of the carriers of both countries would be stepped up to levels to be
agreed upon at different stages. The first period would run the initial
eighteen months of the renewed Agreement to 31 December 1966. Simi-
larly, the second period would be for eighteen months, or until 30 June
1968. This would take care of three years of the Agreement and during
the final two-year period, 30 June 1968 to 30 June 1970, carriers would
not be subject to any kind of restriction as to the frequencies and capacity
they might operate but only to the a posteriori review provisions of the
pact. It is especially interesting that the third and final period should
commence shortly in advance of Mexico's serving as host to the Olympics
in 1968 when it is expected international air traffic will swell beyond all
previous levels. It was also agreed to shorten the first period to calendar
year 1966, with none of the new schedules or services to take effect before
the end of 1965. In other words, the controversial "freeze" agreed to the
year before would remain in effect for another six months, until 1 Jan-
uary 1966. With the periods of escalation thus defined, it was decided that
the frequencies themselves should be postponed for later discussion and
other aspects of the Agreement, primarily the Route Schedules for both
countries were taken up.
C. Principal Route Schedule Changes
Having agreed to the escalation of frequencies in such a way that the
Bermuda principles of the Agreement would be given full effect during
the last two years of the five-year term, the Mexican delegation expected
to obtain major concessions as to new routes. They expected to be able
to extend Mexicana's route beyond its present terminal of Los Angeles
into San Francisco, or to acquire a new Mexico City-San Francisco route
with "fifth freedom" rights beyond, and to acquire a new route from
Mexico City to San Juan, Puerto Rico. They also expected that the United
States route structure would remain substantially as in the existing schedule
set up in the 1960 negotiations. They were therefore taken by surprise
when informed by the United States delegation that it considered the two
matters entirely unrelated, and that as a matter of policy, the United States
is opposed to exchanging "principles for routes." The United States position
was that negotiations regarding routes were to be conducted without re-
spect to any other features of the Agreement and that the fundamental
criteria in defining the route schedules were to be economic. Having ceded
initially in the face of the strong United States stand on frequencies, the
Mexican delegation had no alternative but to continue with discussions of
the routes to be operated by carriers of the two countries under the re-
vised Agreement; in other words, the entire Route Schedule for both
countries was up for review.
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1. The "Open Door" at Acapulco
The leading tourist attraction and most important resort in Mexico is
the Pacific port of Acapulco, about 250 air miles due south of Mexico
City. For many years, Acapulco had been connected by air with Mexico
City exclusively by Aeronaves de Mexico which, during peak seasons, had
operated as many as twelve scheduled round trips daily. Even this fre-
quency was insufficient to satisfy demand at certain times of the year. The
fact that nearly all flights were conducted with piston equipment had
placed the carrier in a vulnerable position, especially since the bulk of
seasonal traffic converging on Acapulco came from the United States on
United States carriers dependent on Aeronaves for connecting space in
either direction. Even though Aeronaves had been successful on every
previous occasion in resisting efforts of other airlines to gain access to
the carrier's most important traffic generating point outside Mexico City,
it was apparent that expanded traffic and the inconvenience to the public
in transferring en route between point of origin or destination in the
United States and Acapulco warranted direct flights, i.e., either non-stop
or through flights without change of aircraft in Mexico City. It was not
surprising, therefore, that demands for direct access to Acapulco by
United States carriers constituted a priority in the list of changes sought
by the American delegation. Their strongest support came from the official
representatives of Mexico's tourist industry who were members of the
Mexican delegation. Aside from Aeronaves as the affected carrier, the
strongest opposition came from the Airline Pilots' Union (ASPA) which
felt that the operation of United States carriers into Acapulco would be
the beginning of a trend which would eventually make deep inroads into
many of the country's domestic services, displacing national airlines and
bringing about a reduction in pillot force or, at least, giving rise to con-
flicts with management over this sensitive issue. After much discussion
within the Mexican delegation itself, a settlement was reached which
satisfied the United States aspirations virtually in full. Four United States
carriers were to be granted the right to establish direct flights between
their northern terminals and Acapulco, in addition to which Mexicana de
Aviaci6n would also be authorized to operate through flights between
Acapulco and the United States terminal of Chicago. As compensation,
Aeronav'es received authority to operate non-stop between Acapulco and
Los Angeles."
In the case of Chicago, the Mexican carrier enjoys exclusive non-stop
authority to Acapulco but may also serve the southern terminus via the
co-terminal Mexico City. On the: other hand, United States carriers may
operate either non-stop or via Mexico City to Acapulco from New York,
Los Angeles, Dallas, and San Antonio. While Aeronaves de Mexico may
'Services to be operated by United States carriers include: New York- Mexico City, Acapulco;
Chicago, Dallas, Fort Worth - Mexico City, Acapulco; San Antonio - Mexico City, Acapulco; Los
Angeles - Mexico City, Acapulco. By Mexican carriers: Acapulco, Mexico City - Washington, New
York and beyond to Europe; Acapulco, Mexico City - Chicago; Acapulco, La Paz - Los Angeles.




operate non-stop between Acapulco and Los Angeles, flights may not be
operated via Mexico City.
Based on the foregoing, and following Mexico's long-established re-
strictive policy with respect to flights by foreign carriers into Acapulco,
it would appear that the American carriers obtained a clear advantage
over the Mexican airlines as a result of the country's new "open door"
policy.'
2. Other Route Changes
With respect to the new Route Schedule for United States carriers,
there were in reality no other changes of consequence, the major innova-
tion being the addition of Acapulco as a co-terminal with Mexico City
on flights from the five major United States terminal points as explained
above. Such changes as did occur mainly involved questions of language
or conformed to actual operating practice or permitted more flexibility.
These are indicated by the following:
(1) Washington was eliminated from Route "A" as a co-terminal with
New York to become a co-terminal with New Orleans (Route "B").
Inasmuch as flights can still originate in New York, touch down at the
terminal of Washington and then proceed non-stop to Mexico City, by-
passing the co-terminal of New Orleans, the carrier's operating authority
is unchanged.
(2) Where, in the case of New Orleans-Merida, Miami-Merida, and
Houston-Mexico City, the language of the previous Agreement had added
"and beyond to Guatemala and beyond," this was changed to read "and
beyond to Central America and Panama and beyond."40
(3) A uniform change, applying to routes operated by carriers of both
countries, was the elimination of the language "via intermediate points,"
which appears in the 1960 Agreement in the definition of United States
Routes "B," "C," and "G" and Mexican Routes "B," "C," "D," "F," and
"H." The intermediate points which may be served within the country
of respective carriers are now stipulated. Thus, in the case of Western
Air Lines' Los Angeles-Mexico City, Acapulco service, the intermediate
point which may be served optionally is San Diego. In reality, certain of
Western's services were already operating via San Diego. A similar change
involved various other routes of both countries without altering the oper-
ating pattern of carriers in effect at the time.
(4) The "border services," added as Routes "K" and "L" to be operated
by a United States carrier, are not considered major modifications to the
Agreement; while expanding the Route Schedule, the effect of these new
services, measured in ton-miles, is negligible in relation to the total volume
of service operated between the two countries as a product of the bi-
lateral.
Of the ten routes available to United States carriers by virtue of the
4 For an idea as to how this advantage works out on a numerical basis see V-D, infra.
4 Route "H," Mexico City-Houston, is, however subject to the proviso that the carrier may not
operate non stop between Mexico City and Panama.
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1960 Agreement, only one, Route "J," was to remain unchanged; all
of the other original nine routes underwent modification, although in some
cases the change involved was little more than a matter of form. Not
only did the Miami, Tampa-Merida, Mexico City route description re-
remain identical to the earlier Agreement, but the stipulation making an
intermediate stop at Merida mandatory despite the co-terminal status of
this point was maintained. This was a most sensitive subject during the
negotiations and will be referred to again in comments on the "Florida
Sector."
Alterations to the route structure of the Mexican carriers were more
extensive but taken altogether do not match the importance of the
Acapulco rights assured for four United States carriers. The following
changes emerged:
(1) Co-terminalling of Acapulco with Mexico City on Route "A" to
Washington and/or New York and beyond. This is of no immediate im-
portance to the carriers designated for this route (Aeronaves de Mexico)
inasmuch as several months earlier the company had scheduled its Mexico
City-New York daily service so that the flights actually originated in
Acapulco. The CAB, of course, has no jurisdiction over points served
within the territory of the carrier beyond the terminal. However, the
revised route description will permit Aeronaves to operate nonstop from
Acapulco to either Washington or New York or both.
(2) Similar co-terminalling occurred in the case of Mexicana's Chicago
service, Route "B." The same comments as above apply, since authoriza-
tion from the Mexican authorities alone would suffice to allow the airline
to originate and terminate flights in Acapulco provided they are con-
ducted via the terminal point of Mexico City. Due to the limitation im-
posed on the United States carrier on this route which is required to
operate all flights to Acapulco 'via Mexico City, Mexicana's authority to
operate nonstop between Chicago and the southernmost terminus is ex-
clusive.
(3) On Route "C," San Antonio, Dallas, and Fort Worth were co-
terminalled, whereas Dallas and Fort Worth had been co-terminalled
with Chicago in the previous Agreement. The intermediate points which
may be served within Mexico on this route are described as "Monterrey
or Guadalajara," which means that only one of these cities may be in-
cluded on any given service. In fact, there was much opposition by the
American delegation to the inclusion of Guadalajara on this route. Agree-
ment in this respect came shortly before signing of the new pact and, as
will be seen, resulted from the discussions on frequency.
(4) By co-terminalling Acapulco with La Paz in Route "E," it becomes
possible for the designated carrier, Aeronaves, to operate non-stop between
Acapulco and the United States terminal of Los Angeles. However, the
designated United States carrier enjoys the same right plus the ability to
route flights via Mexico City.
(5) Route "G," Mexico City-Detroit, constitutes an interesting case
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in that the American opposition to having this flight proceed to any point
in Canada other than Montreal, as previously noted, was withdrawn. The
Route Schedule carries a notation to the effect that "This route may be
operated beyond Detroit to any point or points in Canada," of course,
without traffic rights between Detroit and points served in Canada.
(6) A new route, "H," was added with terminals at Guadalajara and
Houston and involving no intermediate points. This route presumably
is intended for Aeronaves de Mexico which suspended operation on Route
"D" (Mazatlin, Torre6n, Monterrey-San Antonio) of the previous Agree-
ment more than two years earlier. Former route "D" was accordingly
omitted in the revised Schedule.
(7) Another new route, Monterrey-Laredo, Corpus Christi, designated
"I," was the final point on which agreement was reached in negotiations
concerning the Route Schedules for the two countries. The American dele-
gation had originally agreed to a Monterrey-Laredo route in exchange
for the "border services" agreed upon for the United States carriers but
had consistently opposed service to Corpus Christi, either as co-terminal
with Laredo or, as requested by the Mexican delegation, with San Antonio
and Dallas. The "eleventh hour" addition of Corpus Christi was again
related to the question of frequencies, as in the case of Guadalajara on
Route "C.
47
(8) Phoenix was substituted for Tucson as a terminal on the route from
Hermosillo, Mexico ("J"), but Tucson may be served optionally as an
intermediate stop.
(9) In the case of all routes, the same as for United States carriers,
intermediate stops are "pin-pointed." For instance, on Mexicana's route
between Mexico City and Los Angeles, stops may be made only in Guada-
lajara, Puerto Vallarta, and Mazatlin. While these were the only points
being served by the carrier on this route ("D") at the time of negotiation,
the airline had previously operated flights to Los Angeles via such inter-
mediate points as Hermosillo, Mexicali, and Tijuana as permitted by the
"open language" of the 1960 Agreement on the subject of intermediates.
The above, in substance, constitute the revisions to the route structure
available to carriers under the Agreement. As a part of the general under-
standings reached, however, it was agreed that Mexicana's application to
operate from the Island of CozumeP8 to Miami, submitted to the CAB
on 10 June 1964, would be granted but that this would remain outside
the bilateral Agreement as such. This particular case" confronted the
CAB with a dilemma when the application was presented through normal
diplomatic channels. The dilemma stemmed from the fact that the exis-
tence of a formal treaty or Air Transport Agreement, such as the 15
August 1960 Agreement between Mexico and the United States, does not
41 See discussion in sub-para. (3) supra.4 The island of Cozumel, forming part of Mexico's Territory of Quintana Roo, is in the Cari-
bean, 180 miles due east of Merida, Yucatin, and 565 miles southwest of Miami. Separated from the
Mexican mainland by a narrow channel, Cozumel has a population of about 3,000, a number of
hotels, and is a popular resort with Mexicans and an increasingly large number of Americans.
" See note 22 supra.
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constitute an impediment for a carier to make application for a route
other than those provided for in the agreement, so long as the application
is properly presented. At the time of the negotiations on the bilateral, all
procedural steps in Docket No. 15372, up to and including the Examiner's
Report, had been completed. Furthermore, the Examiner's Report, sub-
mitted 14 January 1965, had recommended granting Mexicana's petition.
Therefore, the final decision of the Board and presidential approval were
the only steps pending. Since the Mexican authorities did not feel that the
service in question was so important as to warrant its incorporation in
the Route Schedule, in return for which the United States would probably
exact a quid pro quo, it was decided to cover the question of Mexicana's
proposed Cozumel-Miami operation by a side letter. As originally drafted,
this letter stated, "The United States will grant to Mexico a route from
Cozumel to Miami outside the air transport agreement."5 In its final
form, the letter states, "The United States Government will make every
effort to approve the application of CMA for a permit covering scheduled
services between Cozumel and Miami."' 1 The main reason for this change
in wording, according to the American delegation, was their inability to
make an unqualified commitment to grant the route sought because of
the requirement of White House approval. In the event of approval,"
and if the competent United States authority should certificate a United
States carrier for service from New Orleans to Cozumel, Mexico, is com-
mitted to grant the necessary permit, incorporating in it such conditions
or limitations as may be imposed by the United States in connection with
the Mexican carrier's operation. This latter condition is due to the fact
that during the hearings on Mexicana's application, an impressive list of
restrictions was introduced by means of a stipulation entered into with
Pan American World Airways, the only airline opposing the application.
It has already been noted that: the first interim extension for the pur-
pose of continuing negotiations was for fifteen days from 30 June. An-
nouncement of the extension appeared in Mexico City dailies on Friday,
2 July. Over this weekend, coinciding with the Fourth of July holiday,
most of the members of the United States delegation, who had already been
in Mexico for six weeks, returned to Washington. On the resumption of
negotiation in Mexico on 7 July, a change in attitude was clearly apparent.
Prior to the announcement regarding the extension, the Secretary of
Communications is known to have informed the Mexican delegation that
an agreement was to be reached under any circumstances. It would appear
that word to this effect had ireached the American negotiators and,
furthermore, that this accounted for their stiffened attitude upon re-
turning from Washington. On Saturday, 10 July, a considerable amount
50 Doc. No. 32, Proposed by United States Delegation, 12 July 1965 (working paper).
" Letter from United States Ambassador Fulton Freeman to His Excellency Jos6 Antonio Padilla
Segura (Mexican Secretary of Communication and Transport), 4 Aug. 1965.
s By Application of Compania de Aviacion, S.A. for Air Carrier Permit, CAB Docket No. 15372,
CAB Order No. E-22947 (1 Nov. 1965) (approved by the President 27 Nov. 1965), Cia. Mexicana
was issued a Foreign Air Carrier Permit to operate "between the terminal point Cozumel, Mexico,
and the terminal point Miami, Florida."
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of negotiation was conducted directly between the Secretary and Am-
bassador Freeman and by the time the second extension was announced
substantial agreement had been reached on all matters affecting routes.
The "Florida sector," however, constitutes an exception and accordingly
is dealt with separately.
3. The Florida Sector
While the question of Mexicana's Cozumel-Miami service might be
considered as falling within the "Florida Sector," there are two other
important subjects with respect to which the parties have reserved the
right to further negotiation.
Elsewhere,53 mention is made that in the United States Route Schedule
only Route "J" remained unchanged, and that the Americans were un-
successful in their strong bid to get the Mexicans to withdraw the condi-
tion making a stop in Merida obligatory on Pan American's service from
Miami and Tampa to Mexico City. When this route was included in the
1960 Route Schedule, the carrier had accepted the condition of the Merida
stop without protest. Subsequently, various efforts had been made to have
the condition waived. The chief obstacle, of course, was the advantage
to the Mexican carrier operating non-stop Miami-Mexico City. Aeronaves
de Mexico had fallen heir to the Guest Aerovias' concession for this route
and naturally resisted the idea of Pan American's also acquiring non-stop
authority. After failing in a final attempt to remove the condition, and
relying on strongly worded instructions from Washington, the American
delegation stated that the United States Government had considered that
the condition making the Merida stop mandatory would continue to be
a "sore spot" in the relations between the two countries; and the American
delegation therefore reserved the right to further discussion on this par-
ticular question at an early date.
The second question involved in the "Florida Sector" is one of service
between Mexico and Puerto Rico. The original route proposals made by
Mexico included service extending from Mexico City and Merida, through
Jamaica and on to San Juan, Puerto Rico, including rights to Fifth Free-
dom traffic between the latter two points. It is significant that the original
route proposals submitted by the United States delegation did not provide
for any similar service by an American carrier. However, before reaching
agreement on a number of other questions involving routes of both
countries, the United States delegation proposed that an American carrier
should also be allowed to provide service over such a route. When this
idea was rejected by Mexico, the United States proposed that the service
be included in the Route Schedule of each country but with the additional
understanding that service by the United States designated carrier would
not be initiated during the first three years of the Agreement. The Mexi-
can reaction to this suggestion was that it put all the burden of initiating
the service and establishing the necessary facilities, along with active pro-
motion and sales effort, on their own carrier. The result of this burden
" See discussion at V-C-2 supra.
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would be that the Mexican carrier would require some two to three years
to reach a break-even basis, following which an American carrier would
find no economic problem in the operation of the same route. In the final
analysis, it proved impossible to reach an agreement on the subject of
Mexico-Puerto Rico service, but it is the intent of both parties that further
talks should be held at an early date.
Substantial agreement having been reached on most route matters, the
parties then agreed that the two important questions involved in the
"Florida Sector" should be placed in abeyance for discussion at a later date.
There then remained the matter of frequencies which, as agreed almost
at the outset, were to be escalated during the first three years of the revised
Agreement.
D. Frequency Negotiations
Representatives of the carriers participated actively in the involved
negotiations on frequency. This was necessary because the United States
delegation could not officially enter into these negotiations on behalf of
the carriers.
The American carriers, which heretofore had felt that they had been
unduly restricted in their operations, looked upon this as an opportunity
to obtain approval for maximum increases in frequency or capacity, in
some instances far beyond what they might have reasonably expected to
require for anticipated increases in traffic volume. Certain carriers asked
as much as three times the frequencies they previously had, even though
the first stage was to be effective only throughout calendar 1966. They
would be afforded an opportunity to present their case well in advance of
expiry of this initial period for still further increases based on actual
operating experience.
As a part of the frequency negotiations, American Airlines was
authorized to operate up to ten flights weekly between Chicago, Mexico
City, and Acapulco and seven flights weekly between Dallas, Fort Worth-
Mexico City, Acapulco as well as seven weekly non-stops between Dallas,
Fort Worth-Acapulco. American felt that this was inadequate insofar as
service between Dallas and Mexico City was concerned and requested that
as many as five of their Chicago-Mexico City-Acapulco flights weekly be
permitted to stop in Dallas to augment that frequency. Mexico instead
granted permission for two of American's seven weekly Dallas-Acapulco
non-stops to serve Mexico City as intermediate. In return, the Mexican
government was able to bring about the reinstatement of Guadalajara as
an intermediate along with Monterrey on Mexicana's Mexico City-San
Antonio, Dallas service as noted earlier. American persisted in its demand
for still further increased capacity between Dallas and Mexico City and
was finally allowed to operate up to three of the ten weekly Chicago-
Mexico City, Acapulco flights via Dallas. The effect of this was to permit
a further increase in the carrier; capacity between Dallas and Acapulco,
initially set at seven flights weekly. However, this grant enabled Mexico
to extract a reciprocal concession consisting of the addition of Corpus
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Christi as a co-terminal with Laredo on the route from Monterrey. This
addition had encountered strong resistance from the American delegation.
One United States carrier, not satisfied with an 85 % capacity increase
granted in the case of one of its services for the coming year, stated that it
was no longer bound by its offer to spend "well in excess of $1 million" in
promoting its services to Mexico during this period and within ten days
filed an application ' with the CAB to provide direct service between
Mexico and Hawaii as an extension of its existing Mexico City service and
further to provide service between the Mexican capital, New Zealand, and
Australia and beyond to Hong Kong.
Regardless of the feelings of any one carrier with respect to the approval
for increased frequencies, the fact is that taken all together the conces-
sions made by Mexico represent a significant expansion of capacity avail-
able between the two countries. When negotiations were commenced, the
combined carrier volume operating weekly between Mexico and the United
States amounted to 15,600 seats in each direction. Of this total capacity,
United States carriers provided 62 % of the seats available and Mexican car-
riers 38%. If, during 1966, all carriers, both Mexican and United States,
should operate the maximum capacity permissible, availability would ex-
pand by 64% for a total of 25,850 seats in each direction. In this case the
distribution between airlines of the United States and Mexico would be
58% and 52% respectively. However, this is considered entirely hypo-
thetical, as it is highly unlikely that all the carriers will be capable of ex-
panding their volume of services up to the newly authorized levels or that
such would even be warranted on the basis of traffic demand.
The case of Acapulco is even more striking. Here, if all services were
expanded up to the approved levels, there would be a total of 109 inter-
national flights weekly, roughly fifteen a day versus one a day at the
time of the Agreement, providing more than 17,000 seats in and out of
the Pacific port. Of these flights, 78 could be operated by United States
carriers and 31 by Mexican carriers. However, due to the smaller capacity
of some aircraft used in Mexican operations, 78 % of the overall capacity
would be generated by the American air carriers. It is just as unlikely,
however, that the United States carriers will find traffic developing so
rapidly as to require anything approaching this volume of service.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The sheer volume of air traffic moving between Mexico and the United
States, the number of routes and points served, as well as the number of
carriers subject to the terms of the Air Transport Agreement make any
conclusions which may be drawn especially significant. While Mexico
has denied any hegemony over other countries of Latin America, any
number of criteria clearly indicate that the country enjoys tremendous
prestige and does occupy a position of leadership in this sensitive area of
the world. In addition to its important trade with the United States, the
4 Application of Eastern Airlines for Issuance of a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity,
CAB Docket No. 16357 (26 July 1965).
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bulk of Mexico's trade is conducted with countries whose air communica-
tions and formal treaty relations with the United States are of prime
importance: Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Canada, Italy, and France.
Therefore, the agreements reached at Mexico City last year cannot be
taken as operating in vacuo.
A. Tourism--A Dominant Force
The clearest single conclusion to be drawn from the 1965 revisions to
the Mexico-United States bilateral air Agreement is that tourism is emerg-
ing as the dominant force. On matters affecting routes, services, frequen-
cies, and especially the "opening" of Acapulco, the issues were resolved
primarily on the basis of tourism. Whenever discussions occurred within
the Mexican delegation or when necessary to consult higher government
authority, the interests of tourism received unqualified backing from the
Tourist Department and the National Tourist Council. Generally their
views were sanctioned by other governmental agencies including the
Secretaria de Comunicaciones, the D. A. C., and the Foreign Ministry.
Where opposed to the overriding interest of tourism, neither the national
airlines nor the otherwise influential Pilots' union were able to enforce
their views despite the ultimate effect of the decisions on their own organi-
zations or economy. In fact, the Mexican government appears to recognize
that it may now have to resort to subsidy in support of its national carriers
in competition with other airline, in international services. Such subsidy
would seem warranted, especially in view of revenue accruing to the
government through income generated directly and indirectly by the
liberalized tourist policy.
Due to the prevailing state of euphoria with respect to the new services
to Acapulco around the end of the year, it is likely that the previous ratio
of supply to demand may be reversed to an extent where carrier capacity
will exceed available traffic by a considerable margin. Furthermore, unless
the United States carriers actually operate up to the level of frequencies
negotiated during the first period of the Agreement, they are certain to
encounter greater resistance and more difficulty in obtaining authorization
for further expansion of frequency or capacity. The carriers certainly will
seek further expansion for the 1 January 1967-30 June 1968 term.
B. Principles Versus Objectives
In commenting on the significance of the revisions at the outset," it was
noted that by agreeing to a pre-determination of frequency and capacity
on all but non-competitive services, the United States delegation actually
departed from the country's traditional stand on this subject, even though
such departure was for a stipulated period of time. This is not to imply
that the delegation acted outside its authority or that the policy officials
having ultimate responsibility were unaware of what was going on in
Mexico City. On the contrary, they were seeking to obtain the best possible
solution under the circumstances to what had been a chronic problem
" See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
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both under the Memorandum of Understanding and the later Air Trans-
port Agreement; namely, Mexico's reluctance, wherever an alteration of
frequency or capacity was involved, to full application of the Bermuda
principles of the pact through the process of a priori review in passing on
carrier applications. The Mexican government is now formally committed
to abandon this practice within three years of the current Agreement and
must automatically approve any and all requests by carriers for new fre-
quencies or capacity provided they fall within the negotiated limits. It is
difficult to conceive that after the five-year term of the new Agreement,
Mexico could succeed in re-establishing the authority which the Ley de
Vias Generales de Comunicacion" expressly confers on its public officials
in the areas of air carriers' schedules, volume of service, competition, and
similar matters. In other words, it is now fair to state that the official
policy of the Mexican government in this regard has undergone a funda-
mental change, at least insofar as the country's treaty relationship with
the United States is concerned. It remains to be seen whether such policy
change extends to air agreements which Mexico may, in the future, nego-
tiate or renegotiate with other countries. Based on the outcome of negotia-
tions with Italy, Guatemala, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, and Brazil,
up to the end of 1965, there is no indication that Mexican policy vis-d-vis
these countries has been modified. The United States, nevertheless, by a
temporary relaxation of its own policy, has achieved an important long-
range objective in its relations with Mexico-an objective certain to be
of significance to both countries.
C. Foreign Air Carrier Proceedings
Experience in the processing of section 402 s" applications of both Aero-
naves de Mexico and Mexicana de Aviacion to conform to the terms of
the revised Agreement definitely establishes the need for expedited proceed-
ings where a formal, inter-governmental, treaty-level agreement is in-
volved. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as revised makes no provision
for such expedited action, and foreign carriers must go through the time-
consuming, costly, and sometimes onerous procedural steps required to
obtain a section 402 permit." This is especially true where, as in the case
'"Mexico's Law of General Means of Communications is the organic statute governing all trans-
portation and communications services in the country. Diario Oficial, 19 Feb. 1940. The Law is
currently undergoing revision which may be complete by the end of 1966.5 7 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 402, 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1964).
" As part of the direct testimony submitted at the hearing on the Application of Cia. Mexicana
de Aviacion for Amendment of its Foreign Air Carrier Permit, CAB Docket No. 16562 (10 Dec.
1965), the applicant stated:
[E]very effort has been made to comply with the requirements fixed by Bureau
counsel for evidence regarding the Company's nationality, ownership, qualifications,
physical properties, indebtedness, commercial agreements, present and future intentions
with respect to operations both within and without the purview of the bilateral agree-
ment between the two countries, and many other matters. . . . While reiterating that
all evidence which it has been possible and practical to obtain has been presented, it
is submitted that any information omitted is unnecessary, irrelevant, or would be
redundant and is not essential to reaching a decision on the application; that its
preparation would be onerous, costly, time-consuming, and, as stated, in some cases
impossible, and finally that the extent and detail of the evidence requested is contrary
to the spirit and intent of the formal agreements reached between the Governments
of Mexico and the United States over four months ago.
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of the two carriers mentioned, operations to the United States were already
being conducted under a foreign air carrier permit and the changes or
additions sought in effect constitute amendments to such permit pursuant
to inter-governmental agreement. Procedural delays inherent in section
402 proceedings can place foreign carriers at a competitive disadvantage
and bestow an unfair advantage on United States carriers in certain in-
stances, as did occur in the case of the Acapulco routing. The CAB, by
the simple expedient of an Exemption Order, authorized American,
Braniff, Eastern, and Western to extend their operations to Acapulco."
The Mexican government granted permits to each of these carriers to
initiate service to Acapulco in advance of the 1 January 1966 implementa-
tion date. Both Braniff and Western initiated flights to Acapulco in early
December before hearings had been held on the applications of either
Aeronaves or Mexicana for amendment of their own permits, although
these applications had been filed the preceding September. In both cases,
Bureau Counsel called upon the carriers to produce voluminous evidence
regarding their finances, operations, and related matters, most of which
were already a matter of record. Mexicana, which had intended to inaugu-
rate service to Corpus Christi on 2 January, was obliged to defer the start
of service until 16 January. Such delays are inimical to the good relations
which should prevail as a consequence of treaty arrangements and are
sometimes a source of embarrassment to United States diplomatic repre-
sentatives dealing with local officials.
D. Foreign Carrier Schedule Filing
Section 405 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act and related Parts 231 and
234 of the Board's Economic Regulations requiring the filing of all
schedules and changes thereto are applicable only to domestic carriers. "
As a matter of practicality, most foreign air carriers regularly file schedules
and changes of schedule with the Board. Though there is no statutory
" Application of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. for Exemption Order, CAB Docket Nos. 16403,
16420, 16432 and 16446, CAB Order No. E-.22698 (28 Sept. 1965), issued pursuant to § 416(b)
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, states:
Carrier planning for the winter season must be completed promptly. These circum-
stances have combined to prevent the Board and the carriers from completing the
certification process in time to provide to the public air service benefits that both the
United States and Mexican Governments manifestly wished to confer. To enforce
§ 401 of the act so as to require the :arriers to await Board action on their applica-
tions for certificate authority would be an undue burden upon them due to the un-
usual circumstances of time and season affecting their operations, and would not be in
the public interest as evidenced by the Air Transport Agreement between the United
States and Mexico.
The § 416(b) provisions apply only to United States carriers and are not available to foreign
carriers.
" Application of Compania Mexicana De Aviation, S.A. for Amendment to Foreign Air Car-
rier Permit, CAB Docket No. 16562, CAB Order No. E-23140 (4 Jan. 1966) approving Mexi-
cana's application in CAB Docket No. 16562, received Presidential approval on 19 Jan. 1966. Due
to this continued delay, Mexicana was obliged to further defer the initiation of service over this
route until 15 February 1966.
6 Section 405(b) of the act requires "each air carrier" to file schedules and all schedule
changes with the CAB and the Postmaster General. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 405(b), 72
Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1375 (1964). The Board's economic regulations are found in 14
C.F.R. §5 231, 234 (1965). Section 101(3) defines an "air carrier" as a "citizen of the United
States," as distinguished from a "Foreign Ai: Carrier." Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(3),
72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. S 1301(3) (1964).
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obligation to do so, many foreign carriers are under the impression that
schedules must be filed with the Board. Failure to extend this particular
provision of section 405 to foreign as well as domestic air carriers is a
curious omission, especially since virtually every other country in the
world maintains a routine requirement for schedule filing by all carriers.
Such a requirement would have served to avoid all the furor which resulted
from Mexicana's augmented schedule of flights to the United States at the
end of 1964 in alleged " violation of the "Gentlemen's Agreement." The
United States authorities were not even aware of the increase in schedules
until the new flights were already operating; faced with what amounted
to a fait accompli, they lacked legal authority to curtail the schedules and
had to rely on diplomatic measures which ultimately proved futile.
To summarize, it does not appear that a requirement for schedule filing
by foreign carriers with the CAB could in any sense be construed as un-
reasonable or burdensome. Certainly, foreign carriers, obliged in nearly
all cases by their own governments to file schedules, would not object to
such a requirement.
For the reasons enumerated at the beginning of this article, the Agree-
ment signed in Mexico City on 4 August 1965 has resulted in significant
and lasting changes in the structure of regular air services between Mexico
and the United States. These changes go far beyond the recital in the
Route Annex of services authorized for designated carriers of each country.
In the case of the United States, benefits resulting from revision of the
Air Transport Agreement consist primarily of greatly liberalized fre-
quencies and capacity for carriers of that country, with assurance of full
application of the pact's Bermuda principles by mid-1968. For Mexico,
the principal beneficiary would seem to be the tourist industry, the im-
portance of which has already been discussed and which should in turn
benefit those other sectors of the national economy of which it is an
integral component.
62 See text following note call 27 supra.
1966]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
APPENDIX I
Routes per the Original "Memorandum of Understanding,"
Dated 7 March 1957a
1. The aeronautical authorities of the Government of Mexico shall grant permits
to airlines designated by the Government of the United States of America to
operate air services on the air routes; specified below, via intermediate points, in
both directions, and to make regular stops at the points listed in this paragraph:
A. New York, Washington-Mexico City.
B. Chicago, Dallas, San Antonio-Mexico City, via intermediate points in the
United States.
C. Los Angeles-Mexico City, via intermediate points in the United States.
D. New Orleans-Mexico City.
E. New Orleans-Merida and beyond, to Guatemala and beyond.
F. Miami-Merida and beyond, to Guatemala and beyond.
G. Houston, Brownsville-Tampico, Mexico City, Tapachula and beyond, to
Guatemala and beyond.
The aeronautical authorities of the Government of the United States of America
shall grant permits to airlines designated by the Government of Mexico to operate
air services on each one of the air routes specified below, via intermediate points,
in both directions, and to make regular stops at the points listed in this paragraph:
A. Mexico City-Washington, New York.
B. Mexico City-Chicago, via intermediate points in Mexico.
C. Mexico City-Los Angeles, via intermediate points in Mexico.
D. Mexico City-New Orleans, via intermediate points in Mexico.
E. Mexico City-Miami and beyond., via intermediate points in Mexico.
F. Mexico City-San Antonio, via intermediate points in Mexico.
G. (Pending)."
2. Both Parties agree not to designate, for the present, more than one airline
for each route.
3. An airline designated by either country may, at its discretion, omit stops
on any of the routes specified on any or all flights.
APPENDIX II
Routes per the Definitive "Air Transport Agreement,"
Dated 15 August 19606'
1. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States
of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified
via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled stops in Mexico
at the points specified in this paragraph:
A. New York, Washington-Mexico City.
B. Chicago, Dallas, Fort Worth-Mexico City, via intermediate points in the
United States.
C. Los Angeles-Mexico City, via intermediate points in the United States.
D. New Orleans-Mexico City.
E. New Orleans-Merida and beyond to Guatemala and beyond.
F. Miami-Merida and beyond to Guatemala and beyond.
"aProvisional Arrangement with Mexico, 7 Mar. 1957, [1957]1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 306, T.I.A.S.
No. 3776.
4By an exchange of Notes signed at Washington, 24 Feb. and 28 July 1958, it was agreed that
this route should be La Paz, Baja California-Los Angeles, via intermediate points in Mexico.




G. Houston-Mexico City and beyond to Guatemala and beyond, via intermediate
points in the United States.
H. San Antonio-Mexico City.
I. Miami, Tampa/St. Petersburg-Merida and Cozumel and beyond (cargo and
mail only).
J. Miami, Tampa-Merida, Mexico City.
2. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United Mexican
States shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via
intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled stops in the United
States of America at the points specified in this paragraph:
A. Mexico City-Washington, New York and beyond New York to Europe.
B. Mexico City-Dallas, Fort Worth, Chicago, via intermediate points in Mexico.
C. Mexico City-Los Angeles, via intermediate points in Mexico.
D. Mazatlan, Torreon, Monterrey-San Antonio, via intermediate points in
Mexico.
E. Mexico City-Miami and beyond.
F. La Paz, Baja California-Los Angeles, via intermediate points in Mexico.
G. Mexico City, Monterrey-San Antonio.
H. Hermosillo-Tucson, via intermediate points in Mexico.
I. (Pending)."
3. Points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated
airlines be omitted on any or all flights with the exception of United States Route
J, on which the designated airline is required to make an intermediate stop at
Merida.
APPENDIX III
Routes per the 4 August 1965 Amendments to the Air Transport Agreement of
1960, to be operated during the period 1 January 1966 to 30 June 197067
1. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States
of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes speci-
fied, in both directions, and to make scheduled stops in Mexico at the points
specified in this paragraph:
A. New York-Mexico City, Acapulco.*
B. Washington, New Orleans-Mexico City.
C. Chicago, Dallas, Fort Worth-Mexico City, Acapulco via San Antonio with-
out the right to operate:
(1) Non stop Chicago-Acapulco.
(2) San Antonio-Acapulco (non stop or via Mexico City).
D. San Antonio-Mexico City, Acapulco.
E. Los Angeles-Mexico City, Acapulco via San Diego without the right to
operate non stop San Diego-Acapulco.
F. New Orleans-Mrida and beyond to Central America and Panama and be-
yond.
G. Miami-Merida and beyond to Central America and Panama and beyond.
H. Houston-Mexico City and beyond to points in Central America and beyond,
except that the carrier shall not provide non stop service between Mexico City
and Panama.
I. Miami, Tampa/St. Petersburg-Merida, Cozumel and beyond (cargo and
mail only).
* Non stop New York-Acapulco operation will be deferred until 1 July 1966.
"As part of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 18 June 1960, this route was defined as "Mexico
City-Detroit," with the additional understanding that such service might extend beyond Detroit
into Canada without traffic rights.
" Diplomatic Note No. 213, 4 Aug. 1965, from the United States Ambassador to the Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Relations.
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J. Miami, Tampa-Merida, Mexico City.
K. MissionlMcAllen/Edinburg-Monterrey.
L.Harlingen/San Benito-Veracruz via Tampico.
2. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United Mexican
States shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified,
in both directions, and to make scheduled stops in the United States of America at
the points specified in this paragraph:
A. Acapulco, Mexico City-Washington, New York and beyond New York to
Europe.
B. Acapulco, Mexico City-Chicago.
C. Mexico City-San Antonio, Dallas, Fort Worth via Monterrey or Guada-
lajara.
D. Mexico City-Los Angeles via Guadalajara, Puerto Vallarta, Mazatlin.
E. Acapulco, La Paz-Los Angeles via Tijuana.
F. Mexico City-Miami and beyond.
G. Mexico City-Detroit. * *
H. Guadalajara-Houston.
I. Monterrey-Laredo, Corpus Christi.
J. Hermosillo-Phoenix via Tucson.
* * This route may be operated beyond Detroit to any point or points in Canada
without traffic rights between Detroi: and such point or points in Canada.
3. Points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated
airlines be omitted on any or all flights with the exception of United States
Route J, on which the designated airline is required to make an intermediate stop
in Merida.
4. It is recognized that neither party will impose any unilateral restrictions
on an airline or airlines of the other party with respect to capacity, frequencies,
or type of aircraft employed over arty route specified in the schedule annexed to
this agreement.
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